What did NSC 162/2 reveal about Eisenhower's Cold War priorities?

NSC 162/2 shows that Eisenhower wanted to deter Soviet aggression without spending more on defence than the US could sustain over time. Nuclear striking power was central, but it depended on a functioning economy, conventional forces and cooperation with allies. The document does not describe a strategy of relying on atomic weapons alone.

Approved on 30 October 1953, the paper set out basic US national security policy early in Eisenhower's presidency. The Korean armistice and the growth of Soviet nuclear capabilities made it especially important to balance military strength against what the US could afford in the long term.

Three choices stand out in the policy paper:

• Make the threat of retaliation believable. Paragraphs 9 and 11 emphasise the ability to strike an enemy, especially with atomic weapons. The aim was deterrence: an opponent expecting unacceptable damage might decide not to attack. This depended on how the opponent judged the threat; it did not guarantee that every conflict would be prevented.
• Preserve the foundations of strength. Paragraph 9 also links security to a strong economy, morale and free institutions. Spending too much could weaken the society the military was supposed to protect. Keeping the economy strong was therefore part of security policy, not an unrelated concern at home.
• Keep allies and access to bases. Paragraph 12 explains the importance of overseas bases and host-government cooperation. Nuclear capability could not remove the need for diplomacy: bases were useful only if allies continued to permit their use.

These priorities could pull in different directions. A threat that seemed affordable in Washington could alarm an ally worried about becoming a target. Likewise, an enormous military programme might increase fighting strength immediately but damage the economy over time. The document helps you see why these choices had to be considered together.

Its origin and purpose also set limits. It is an official statement of approved policy, written to guide government action. It cannot show by itself whether every agency followed that policy, whether allies accepted it or whether Soviet leaders were deterred. Its description of Soviet aims shows what US leaders thought, not independent proof of what Soviet leaders intended.

To find out whether the policy was carried out, compare it with budgets, troop deployments, alliance negotiations and responses to actual crises. To judge deterrence, examine opponents' records too: the absence of a general war does not prove which policy prevented one. NSC 162/2 shows what the administration wanted to achieve and the choices it faced, rather than proving that its New Look strategy succeeded.

Take your source analysis further with the NSC 162/2 excerpt in the Cold War strategy source questions. Explain what its origin, purpose and content reveal about US priorities, then identify what other evidence you would need to judge the results.